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Abstract

The standard theory of optimal jurisdictional size hinges on the existence of economies of scale
in the provision of local public goods and services. However, despite its relevance for forced
local amalgamation programs and related policies, the empirical evidence on the existence of
such economies of scale remains elusive. The main goal of this paper is to produce an updated
and comprehensive quantitative review of the existence of economies of scale in the provision
of local public goods using a meta-analysis approach to systematize the wide range of empirical
approaches and modeling frameworks found in the previous literature. Our analysis confirms
the presence of moderately increasing to constant returns to scale in the provision of local
services across traditional local service sectors such as education, water and sanitation, and
garbage collection. We identify best practices for future empirical research in this area, which
should rely on physical output as the metric of activity, production cost data as the measure of
input expense, and a translog specification function for the modeling of cost functions. Finally,
we find evidence that the determinants of output cost elasticity include bidirectional publication
bias and population density but do not include the presence or absence of modern “lean”
production technologies or the (perceived) capital intensity of the sector, contrary to
conventional wisdom. These findings have significant policy implications for countries
considering jurisdictional consolidation programs.
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1. Introduction
The standard theory of optimal jurisdictional size developed by Oates (1972) and
extended later on by other authors (e.g., Alesina & Spolaore, 2003) hinges on the existence of
economies of scale in the provision of local public goods and services. However, the empirical
evidence on the existence of such economies of scale remains elusive. Obtaining sound evidence
on this issue is as relevant as ever for efficient decentralization policy design. Many countries
have embarked over the years on forced jurisdictional consolidation or amalgamation programs
based on the supposedly insufficient economies of scale in the delivery of local public services
among their existing, and allegedly small, local governments. However, the evidence for such
moves is far from conclusive, as Gendzwill et al. (2020) show after reviewing 31 studies for 14
countries implementing territorial reforms in recent times. Hence, this issue calls for a systematic
and in-depth quantitative analysis that summarizes and evaluates the evidence available. The
main goal of this paper is to produce an updated and comprehensive quantitative review of this
important issue using a meta-analysis approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section two, we review the definitions
and different interpretations in the literature concerning economies of scale in the delivery of
public services. Section three provides a summary of the stylized facts on economies of scale in
the public economics literature. Section four offers a systematic quantitative review of the
literature as the initial step to conducting the meta-analysis. Section five shows the results from
the meta-analysis’ regressions. Section six concludes.
2. On Alternative Definitions of Economies of Scale
In its classical definition, a production process is characterized by economies of scale if:
“when all inputs are increased by a certain factor λ, output increases by a factor larger than that
λ” (Panzar & Willig, 1977). Alternatively, economies of scale exist when we can increase the
1

production of a good or service without increasing productions costs in the same proportion. The
sources of such economies of scale are varied. They could be derived from the specialization of
the production process (which may only be viable for larger levels of output); they may originate
from increased bargaining power with suppliers once production increases (leading to lower or
discounted prices for inputs); or they may be related to the spread of fixed costs across larger
production levels (thus reducing average prices).
The most commonly used mathematical formulation of economies of scale is owed to
Baumol et al. (1988): 𝑆𝑆 =

𝐶𝐶(𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

=

1

𝜕𝜕 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶)
𝜕𝜕 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑞𝑞)

1

= 𝜀𝜀 . Economies of scale (S) or increasing returns to
𝑦𝑦

scale (used interchangeably here forth) exist when S >1; that is, when the marginal cost of

production is below the average cost. Constant or decreasing returns to scale exist when S is
equal or less than unity, respectively. In elasticity terms, economies of scale exist when the cost
elasticity of output is smaller than unity (𝜀𝜀𝑦𝑦 < 1). 1

The literature has predominantly used this definition of economies of scale, although

other contributions have also merited attention. In particular, Caves et al. (1984), in their analysis
of scale economies of local service airlines’ costs, include a measure of network length (or points
served) for the calculation of economies of scale. In their interpretation, short-term economies of
scale are defined as 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝜀𝜀

1

𝑦𝑦 +𝜀𝜀𝑁𝑁

where 𝜀𝜀𝑁𝑁 is the cost elasticity of the network length. As in

Baumol et al, returns to scale exist when RTS >1. In addition, Caves et al. (1984) argue that the
estimation of long-term economies of scale needs to take into account the quasi-fixed production

The definition implies that the cost elasticity of output cannot be zero, as that would lead to infinite economies of
scale.

1

2

1−𝜀𝜀𝑍𝑍

inputs (Z) and thus 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝜀𝜀

𝑦𝑦 +𝜀𝜀𝑁𝑁

, with 𝜀𝜀𝑍𝑍 as the cost elasticity of quasi-fixed production inputs. 2

The empirical literature on the existence of economies of scale in the production of public

services has concentrated on the estimation of the cost elasticity of output, using a variety of
modeling frameworks. However, important contributions to the literature have adopted the
interpretation of economies of scale proposed by Caves et al. (1984), such as in Mizutani and
Urakami (2001), Aubert and Reynaud (2005), or Filippini and Prioni (2003).
3. Stylized Facts in the Literature
An initial review of the literature unveils a series of stylized facts which help shape our
quantitative analysis below. 3
3.1 Capital vs. labor-intensive services
From production theory, it would be reasonable to assume that economies of scale are
more likely to be found in capital-intensive goods or services, where the investment in capital
goods (i.e., fixed costs) can be spread across more units of output (Dollery & Fleming, 2006;
Bel, 2013). As we see below, this conjecture is only partially fulfilled.
In Chile, Albala-Bertrand and Mamatzakis (2004) find economies of scale in the
provision of transport, sewerage, and power grid services. Bel (2005) and Alvarez et al. (2003)
show (for Spain) that solid waste collection and processing offers important savings in
production costs derived from larger client populations. This is a finding shared both by Callan
and Thomas (2001) in their study of 110 municipalities in the Massachusetts area and by
McDavid (2000), who studies cost patterns for 327 local governments of less than 1000 citizens

2
By quasi-fixed production inputs, the authors refer to the fact that, although in the long-run all inputs are
traditionally assumed to be variable, some of them, including capital and labor for instance, can be partially
adjustable.
3
This section benefits from earlier reviews including Boyne (1995) and Andrews et al. (2002) in the area of
education, Byrnes and Dollery (2002) for Australian local governments, and Bel (2009) for selected sectors.
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in Canada. Conversely, Bel and Mur (2009) do not find scale economies on solid waste services
in small rural municipalities in the region of Aragon (Spain), insofar as most of them rely upon
intermunicipal cooperation or outsourcing. This conclusion is reinforced by the empirical
analysis of Hortas-Rico and Salinas (2014). Supra-municipal aggregation of services would fade
scale economies.
Concerning the water sector, Cunha Marques and De Witte (2011) found significant
economies of scale, with an optimal scale of the utilities located between 160,000 and 180,000
inhabitants, well over the average Portuguese municipality (their study population). These
figures are close to those estimated by Turley et al. (2018) for Ireland, where economies of scale
are found to exist up to 140,000 inhabitants. For Spain, Prieto et al. (2015) also find significant
economies of scale for water supply, sewerage, and water cleansing; this effect would be
reinforced by population density.
In the area of urban transport, seemingly contradictory results are found depending on the
sample used for the analysis. For example, Berechman (1983) finds economies of scale in the
operation of buses in Israel but constant returns to scale are found by Matas and Raymond (1998)
for Spain and by Filippini and Prioni (2003) for Switzerland. However, moderate increasing
returns to scale are found by Farsi et al. (2007) for Swiss urban transport. More recently, Avenali
et al. (2016), using data for Italy, show the existence of weak economies of scale and only for
small size services. There may be additional factors specific to transportation modes and
geographic conditions that influence transportation scale economies and that do not have the
same, or as strong an, effect on other sectors’ economies of scale.
More conclusive is the evidence obtained in the area of garbage collection, where solid
evidence of economies of scale is generally found (Bel, 2009). However, in his survey of the
4

literature, Bel (2013) also concludes that this effect is diluted when jurisdiction population is
over a threshold of between 20,000 and 50,000 inhabitants. Hence, increasing returns would be
stronger in countries where the average size of municipalities is smaller.
A corollary of the above proposition, based on production and cost theory, is that laborintensive local services should offer less potential for economies of scale. A pioneering reference
from this perspective is the work of Hirsch (1959) for police services in U.S. municipalities, who
found no evidence of economies of scale. Analogously, Ahlbrandt (1973) examined 44 cities and
districts of Seattle’s metropolitan area and found no evidence of economies of scale in the
provision of firefighting services. Similar conclusions are reached by Alt (1971) and Boaden
(1971) and Danzinger (1978) in the cases of England and Wales. Furthermore, Ostrom and Parks
(1973), Dilorenzo (1981), and Gyimah-Brempong (1987) find evidence of higher production
costs for firefighting and police services with the greater population size of the jurisdiction in the
United States. However, this early literature was not totally void of positive evidence on
economies of scale. For example, Bodkin and Conklin (1971) report declining average costs of
production with higher population size for police and fire services in local governments in the
United States. The study, however, is substantially old and there has been considerable
technological change in the provision of policing that could substantially change the scale
economies estimate.
In the case of the provision of public schooling, evidence of economies of scale is found
by Chambers (1978), Butler and Monk (1985), Callan and Santerre (1990), Duncombe et al.
(1995), Jimenez (1986), Reschovsky and Imazeki (1997, 1999), and Andrews (2013). On the
other hand, Gyimah-Brempong and Gyapong (1991) find decreasing returns to scale in the
production of education in Michigan school districts. A general conclusion of practically all these
5

studies on education services has been that scale economies vanish at relatively low levels of
student enrollment. In this same vein, Duncombe et al. (1995) show that the consolidation of
school districts in the State of New York may have offered savings in education costs, although
the gains were limited to the consolidation of districts with fewer than 500 students. A similar
study for Iowa by Edelman & Knudsen (1990) concluded that the gains in terms of economies of
scale were found for student populations between 800 and 900. For the state of Maine, Deller
and Rudnicki (1992) estimated the optimal size of the education district to be at around 2,000
students. These studies, however, predate widespread use of internet and mobile technologies,
which could impact estimates.
Concerning other labor-intensive public services, Hortas-Rico and Salinas (2014) do not
find economies of scale in social services in Spanish municipalities. In the case of security
(municipal police), scant savings in cost are shown and only up until 500 inhabitants. Moreover,
they only find evidence of significant economies of scale in the case of general administration
for up to 20,000 inhabitants.
3.2 Measurement, measurement, measurement
The mixed evidence on economies of scale gathered from the empirical literature may
well be due, at least partially, to critical differences in the measures of output and production
costs used in the different analyses. In their review of previous works on the existence of
economies of scale in Australian local governments, Byrnes and Dollery (2002) conclude that,
even when homogeneous goods are analyzed, the evidence as to whether economies of scale
exist in their production is inconclusive. They argue that inaccurate measures of
output/production and costs are partly to blame for the variety of results found in the literature.
This general critique to the body of empirical contributions on the existence of economies
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of scale in public service delivery is in fact an old one. Tiebout (1960) criticized Hirsch’s (1959)
seminal contributions to the literature for his use of population as a proxy for public service
output. Tiebout (1960; p. 444) argued that “there is no necessary relationship between population
and either the output or quality of the good.” In fact, larger population may lead, Tiebout argued,
to larger per capita expenditures, implying no economies of scale. Studies using population as a
proxy for output levels are rare nowadays, although they represented a substantial share of early
works in this empirical area.
The use of expenditure data as a substitute or instead of cost data for the estimation of
cost functions has also been criticized for obvious reasons. Changes in per capita expenditures in
a public service may be due to reasons other than production costs; including administrative
inefficiencies (Tiebout, 1960; Breton, 1965; Duncombe & Yinger, 2007). As cost data have been
made increasingly available, empirical works have favored their use and the number of academic
contributions using per capita expenditure as a proxy for average cost has declined over time.
There is also substantial evidence in the literature that the size of economies of scale is
largely affected by the measure of output selected, even when the measures refer to the same
service. In their study of cost of bus services provision in Switzerland, Filippini and Prioni
(2003) find larger economies of scale when the output measure is the number of bus stops as
opposed to bus-kilometers. This finding corroborates the results from Berechman and Giuliano
(1984), who document diseconomies of scale in bus operation in the United States if bus-miles
are used as the output measure, and instead economies of scale were found if revenue per
passenger is used. Unfortunately, in most cases, there may not be a clear superior choice of
output measure. Therefore, we need to be aware that evidence on the existence of economies of
scale in the delivery of public services may be dependent on the output measure selected for the
7

analysis.
Finally, Tran et al. (2018) outline the relevance of controlling for population density
when analyzing the extent of scale economies attached to involved population size. Given the
strong correlation between both variables, omitting the first one upwardly biases the effect of the
second. Using data for 68 Australian municipalities, they show that local government
expenditure is characterized by significant economies of scale. However, once municipalities are
stratified by population density, the evidence for scale economies largely disappears. In contrast,
evidence for Brazilian municipalities reported by Bernardelli et al. (2020) shows that economies
of scale remain when the analysis controls for the effect of population density.
3.3 A U-shaped average cost function
A third salient finding in the literature is the concentration of economies of scale in
smaller (population-wise) jurisdictions in studies using jurisdictions (as opposed to production
units) as the focus of their analysis. This would appear to signal the expected U-shape of the
long-term average cost curve for public service production. The seminal Hirsch (1959) study
reports evidence of economies of scale in firefighting services in municipalities of less than
100,000 people and increasing average costs over that population size. In the same vein, Bodkin
& Conklin (1971) find evidence of declining average costs in police and firefighting services for
localities of between 5,000 and 10,000 people. Additionally, Gyimah-Brempong (1987), in his
analysis of the Florida case, estimated that diseconomies of scale in the provision of police
services start at population levels of around 50,000 residents. Sole-Olle & Bosch (2005) find
substantial economies of scale for provision of local government services in Spanish
municipalities with a population below 5,000 citizens but growing unit costs of provision until
the population is over or about 50,000. Using more sophisticated spatial econometric tools, the
recent contribution by Hortas-Rico and Rios (2019) corroborate the existence of a U-shape curve
8

for Spanish municipalities over the period 2003-2011. Total current spending decreases with
population and increases with the square of population, suggesting optimal size would be slightly
over 10,000 inhabitants. Again, for Spain, the recent contribution by Piñero et al. (2021) shows a
U-shape with the minimum attained for population sizes in the bracket 5,000-10,000. However,
this result is not based on econometric estimates, but on careful descriptive analysis of data.
Using a sample of Catalonian (Spanish) municipalities, Bel & Fagueda (2009) show
evidence of substantial economies of scale in solid waste collection (attained by inter-municipal
cooperation in the provision of this service) for municipalities below 20,000 citizens, but no
gains in unit costs for municipalities over that population. In Sweden, Nelson (1992) shows that
savings in the production of local services derived from municipal consolidation seem limited to
municipalities of very small population size (below 2,000 citizens after the consolidation). In
light of these and other contributions, Bish (2001; p.14) concludes that approximately 80 percent
of local government activities do not possess economies of scale beyond relatively small
municipalities with populations of 10,000 to 20,000.
The review of the previous empirical literature also shows different within-country results
in terms of whether economies of scale are present, depending on the sample of jurisdictions and
databases used. This result is more apparent in a third group of studies which analyze overall
expenditure patterns before and after processes of jurisdictional consolidation or inter-municipal
cooperation. This may be a result of aggregating all local expenditures on public goods and
services. The evidence on economies of scale would become even more inconclusive after
aggregating both capital- and labor-intensive services, with different potential in the reduction of
average production costs due to larger volume. For example, in a series of studies in the early
1970s, Davies et al. (1971) and Davies and McMillan (1972) report increasing costs of provision
9

(measured as total local public expenditure, excluding social services) with higher population
size in the U.K., a result also partially confirmed by Mehay (1981). Byrnes and Dollery (2002)
review a good number of studies with similar but also contradictory findings following the local
government consolidation process that took place in Australia during the 1990s. More recently,
Miyazaki (2018) analyzes the relationship between municipal consolidation in Japan,
discovering that per capita current expenditure does increase after consolidation, but
subsequently they gradually fall. The author suggest that this result could be explained by factors
such as internalization of spillovers in local public good provision, increased heterogeneity of
preferences in consolidated municipalities, and/or less competitiveness among municipalities.
Blom-Hansen et al. (2016) also conclude with a pessimistic view on the net gains of
amalgamations. Using a differences-in-differences approach on mergers in Denmark, they
conclude that cost savings in some areas are offset by deterioration in others, while for most
public services, jurisdiction size did not matter at all. Moreover, the analysis by Blesse and
Baskaran (2016) on Germany add two suggestive results. First, reductions in administrative
expenditures are limited to compulsory (not voluntary) mergers. Second, reductions in costs are
more relevant in the case of mergers with a larger number of participants and when there is a
dominant partner in the merger (annexations).
3.4 Modeling frameworks for the cost function
The empirical literature on economies of scale in local public service delivery has seen
three somewhat overlapping but otherwise well-differentiated stages in the modeling of the cost
functions of the production process. Early works in this area used a linear function, quadratic in
the measure of output, to establish the existence of U-shaped cost curves (Hirsch 1959, 1965;
Bodkin & Conklin, 1971; Knapp, 1982; Kumar, 1983, among others). The reporting standards of
the early contributions are arguably weaker than those of more recent works. For example, many
10

of the articles reviewed from this early stage do not provide descriptive statistics of the variables
used, naturally making the calculation of the elasticities difficult. The sample of observations for
the meta-analysis below suffers therefore from a bias towards more recent articles.
A second wave of contributions to the analysis of economies of scale in local service
delivery incorporates logarithmic cost functions that allow the direct estimation of the cost
elasticity of production. This sub-sample of works assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function,
a modeling framework that still incorporates important limitations in the analysis of economies
of scale, such as the assumed constant elasticity of substitution of factors of production and
returns to scale and the homotheticity of the production function (Gyimah-Brempong, 1987). The
largest number of available works has used this modeling framework, including the seminal
contributions from Stevens (1978) in the sector of refuse collection, Duncombe et al. (1995) in
education, and Christoffersen et al. (2007) in the cleaning of schools in Denmark.
The third and more recent wave of empirical works in this area have heavily favored the
use of the translogarithmic cost functions as a modeling framework. In contrast to the CobbDouglas function, the multi-product translog cost function places fewer restrictions on the
parameters (e.g., does not assume constant elasticity of substitution of factors of production), and
allows for the analysis of multi-product production processes that are common in certain sectors
(e.g., primary and secondary education for instance). An early contribution in the area of bus
transport that uses the translog modeling framework is that of Berechman (1983), but the
framework has been applied to every possible service including Drake and Simper (2002) in the
area of police, Prieto et al. (2015) in sewerage, paving and lighting, Fabbri and Fraquelli (2000)
and Prieto et al. (2015) in water supply, and Jimenez (1986) in education. The more sophisticated
modeling framework offered by the translog function signals the potentially more accurate and
11

solid estimates of economies of scale, so any quantitative analysis of the literature must control
for this important development. However, more recent contributions explore the possibility of
relying upon even more flexible functional forms. For instance, Bikker and Van der Linde (2016)
compare results for administrative costs using the translog cost function with up to three
alternatives to analyze local public administration expenditure in Netherlands.
In conclusion, evidence of economies of scale for local public good provision that would
justify Oates' (1972) theoretical argument for larger governmental units can be found but needs
to be adequately contextualized. To the significant empirical limitations related to the
measurement of output and cost of service production, we must add the complications generated
by different (and coexisting) technologies and the specificities of geographical areas. Our initial
review of the literature leads us to conclude that economies of scale, when found, are sector
specific, population bound, and perhaps even temporary in their range and size, depending on the
available technologies of production of the particular time period. Economies of scale arising
from larger size jurisdictions may only exist for a small number of locally provided services. We
next turn to our attempt to produce more precise information on these issues.
4. Meta-analysis: A Systematic Quantitative Literature Review
Following Stanley (2001) our meta-analysis is structured in four stages.
4.1 Identifying all relevant studies and choosing a common metric
The first stage is to identify as complete a sample of studies in the area of interest as
possible. We reviewed 115 empirical studies in total from a variety of sources and journals on
economies of scale in local public service delivery, including several PhD dissertations and
unpublished papers.
The scope of our meta-analysis includes all published or unpublished empirical papers in
the area, published in English or Spanish. Our search included two standard databases (EconLit
12

and Dissertation abstracts) and the Google Scholar, Google, and Bing standard search engines,
without any time-period restriction. We also contacted several authors for unpublished papers,
dissertations, and government reports, but only with mixed success. In addition, the
bibliographies of all papers reviewed were scanned for additional studies, applying a “snowball”
approach to study identification.
Having obtained 115 papers overall on the topic, the selection of pieces to be included in
the meta-analysis used the following criteria: First, we selected only papers that referred to local
government-provided services. There exist substantial contributions on the economies of scale of
some public services that are not local in nature, such as power generation or regional
transportation services. These non-local studies were excluded from the analysis. Second, we
eliminated from our pool of papers those which did not use regression analysis as the main
estimation methodology for economies of scale. This may have biased the sample towards more
recent contributions, which are more prone to use regressions as opposed to other methodologies,
such as simple correlation coefficients.
Third, the review of the literature unveiled a series of studies using the production
function approach to the analysis of local public service provision. None of these studies can be
incorporated into the dataset as they do not truly test for economies of scale but rather for the
impact of financing levels on critical performance indicators. In these studies, the left-hand side
variable is traditionally a measure of service quality (i.e., average value of standardized tests in
education, etc.), not the production costs. Thus, they offer complementary evidence which cannot
be incorporated into our quantitative review.
Fourth, the selection of our variable of interest introduced additional limitations to the
papers that could be used in the analysis. The proposition we want to test in this meta-analysis is
13

that economies of scale exist in the production of local public services. Note that we bundle all
local services. We do so because, with very few exceptions, local governments are expected to
take on the delivery of a standard of all local services and not just a selection of them.
Asymmetric assignments of functional responsibilities across local governments are rare in the
international experience. Thus, for example, in most countries jurisdictional consolidation is
sought for and requires the delivery of all services to a larger population, as opposed to a small
or selective set of public services. 4
Given the theoretical framework discussed and the proposition we want to test, the
natural variable of interest for our meta-analysis is the cost elasticity of output. This statistic best
summarizes the empirical results in the previous literature. 5 The use of the cost elasticity of
output as our measure of economies of scale immediately imposes additional restrictions on our
sample of studies. Papers where the statistic is not reported or from which it cannot be calculated
were discarded. As discussed, several of the early contributions in this area use a linear (and
quadratic) cost functional form. When descriptive statistics are provided, we can calculate the
attached elasticity and thus the paper is added to the dataset. In many cases, however, such
information was not available and the paper was discarded.
The selection process outlined above left us eventually with 56 studies that reported 76
values of the cost elasticity of output for different services. Of those 76 observations, 55 reported
their attached standard errors and 21 did not. The availability of standard errors is crucial as the
meta-analysis essentially weights the observations by their variance. In their absence, other

4
If special districts exist for the delivery of separate services, as is the case in the U.S. with school districts, etc.,
then it can make sense to conduct the study for unbundled services. In this case, the number of observations
available to conduct reliable statistical analysis can become the challenge.
5
Earlier contributions in the literature used the total cost of production (in monetary terms) as the dependent
variable. We rejected this option as it did not offer a realistic or theoretically sound alternative.
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measures of study size can be used, such as the inverse of the degrees of freedom of the study,
but generally they are less satisfactory. Our empirical work will include estimates of the average
“true” value of economies of scale for those observations for which standard errors are reported
and for the whole sample of observations (76) using a different measure of study size.
The data set includes studies from 1978 to 2020. As discussed already, several studies
offer more than one observation, and we include all of them in the dataset. Observations for a
total of 8 services and 22 countries are included. As is traditionally the case with cross sections,
the data set of studies suffers from unobserved heterogeneity, as not all relevant moderators or
control variables may have been coded.
The inclusion of studies that used translog cost functions also required calculating the
individual statistic where the estimate of economies of scale, as opposed to the cost elasticity of
output, was reported. When the study estimated both the Cobb-Douglas and translog functional
forms of the cost function, the translog estimate of cost elasticity of output was selected for
consistency, unless the Cobb-Douglas estimate was the preferred estimate of the author.
The alternative use of the Caves et al. (1984) measure of economies of scale and the
Baumol et al. (1988) measure introduces a certain level of heterogeneity in the value of the
dependent variable. The former, as we discussed earlier, includes in the estimation of economies
of scale a measure of network length. As it was not possible to completely homogenize the
statistics from the different studies, our meta-regression accordingly controls for this fact with a
variable (baumol) which takes a value of one for the studies using the Baumol et al. (1988)
measure of economies of scale and a value of zero otherwise.
Sample dependency in meta-analysis is a common risk that can manifest itself in a variety
of forms. First, it may be that many observations are obtained from the same study (and thus the
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same sample). This may include observations obtained from different estimation methods over
the same sample or the use of the same data sample by many different researchers. Fortunately,
all of the studies included in our dataset use different samples. This limits sample dependency to
the greatest possible extent, making our observations virtually fully independent. In our dataset,
we also include the author’s preferred model specification or estimation in the cases where more
than one regression is run on the same sample. However, it is the case that several studies present
estimations over different samples. In some cases, the samples are independent from each other,
and their inclusion as separate observations does not present further problems. In other cases,
several estimations are obtained from different sub-sets of the same sample. We also include
them as separate observations, but control in our meta-regression with a dummy variable for
studies from which we obtain more than one data point.
A different type of dependency is that caused by errors in the specifications of the
econometric model that are reproduced in other studies. In our sample, this would include, for
instance, the need to control for the possibility of joint public and private provision of the service
being analyzed, or the possibility of multi-product functions. We define moderators in our righthand side of the equation to control for such occurrences.
4.2 Meta-regression
As discussed, the studies analyzed differ in many critical dimensions, including the
functional form of the cost equation, the estimation method, and even the measure of production.
The presence of this significant “between-study heterogeneity” requires the application of metaregression techniques that allow for random-effects estimation rather than the fixed-effect metaanalysis commonly employed for highly homogenous sets of studies. With the meta-regression
we can investigate “the extent to which statistical heterogeneity between results of multiple
studies can be related to one or more characteristics of the studies” (Hardbord & Higgings, 2008,
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p. 493).
In a random-effects meta-regression, the individual study estimates of the variable of
interest y are assumed to be distributed normally around a mean effect θ and with a betweenstudy variance τ2 and a standard error of each study denoted as σi. More specifically, we assume,
following Harbord and Higgings (2008) that: 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 |𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 ∼ 𝑁𝑁(𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 , 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2 )where 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 ∼ 𝑁𝑁�𝜃𝜃, 𝜏𝜏 2 �: so 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ∼
𝑁𝑁(𝜃𝜃, 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜏𝜏 2 ). Or equivalently: 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ; where 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 ∼ 𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜏𝜏 2 ) and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ∼ 𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2 )
Our dependent variable (y) for the meta-analysis is the cost elasticity of output.

Regressors include the moderators identified during the process of coding and discussed above.
We perform variance-Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression analysis to attach more weight
to estimations with lower standard error and thus believed to be more accurate. 6 We aim to
estimate the average (true) cost elasticity of output for local public service delivery. The
algorithm used for the estimation calculates first the between study variance (τ2) and later the β1

coefficients using as weights 𝜎𝜎2 + 𝜏𝜏2.

The unconditional (average) cost elasticity of output in our sample of 76 observations is

0.597: if service output increases by 1 percent, the cost of provision increases by 0.6 percent,
signaling some substantial economies of scale. The results of the meta-regression are presented
in the next section below.
An additional issue we need to address in our analysis is that of potential publication bias
in our data sample. As indicated above, publication bias may be present because of the higher
likelihood that a study is published if it reports statistically significant results. Thus, following
Bom and Ligthart (2009) we assume that: 𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑔𝑔 �𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖 �� + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 ; where 𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖 represents the
6

Specifically, we use the metareg command of Stata.
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observed estimates, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 is the population parameter and μ is the sampling error.

So, if there is publication bias, the insertion of the standard errors in the meta-regression

should yield statistically significant coefficients for that variable. Previous studies have assumed
publication bias is linear (Card & Krueger, 1995), whereas others (Stanley & Doucouliagos,
2007) argue the relationship between the estimate and its standard error is more likely to be nonlinear and propose a quadratic approximation. In their study of the output elasticity of public
capital, Bom and Ligthart (2009) present a comprehensive analysis of publication bias and we
follow their methodology in our analysis. Our analysis will allow for identifying the direction of
the bias and select the appropriate control for our meta-regression including all relevant
moderators.
Again following Bom and Ligthart (2009), we estimate the equation:
� ℎ
� ℎ
𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃0 + ∑𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒�𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 � 𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 � 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖

(1)

where, as discussed, 𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖 represents the observed cost elasticity estimates, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 is the population

parameter and μ is the sampling error. The term ∑𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the moderator variables
coded in our meta-analysis, whereas 𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 (𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ) are dummy variables coded 1 if 𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖 is positive

(negative) and zero otherwise. They are interacted with the standard errors of 𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖 . The structure of

the equation allows us to test for different versions of publication bias.

If the term ∑𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is eliminated, we can test for publication bias in the (assumed)

ℎ
ℎ
absence of heterogeneity between studies. If both terms: 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖 � 𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 and 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖 � 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 are

included in the regression as moderators, we are able to test for bidirectional publication bias.

Lastly, if we include solely the standard error as one term in the regression (that is, 𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝 = 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛 =
ℎ = 1), we are able to test for unidirectional publication bias. The superscript h allows us to
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introduce the non-linear publication bias test. Thus, if h=1, we test for linear publication bias, but
if h=2, we assume a quadratic, non-linear relation between the estimates and their standard
errors.
4.3 Identifying moderator variables: The coding process and related hypotheses
During the process of coding the empirical papers identified, we uncovered a number of
features that may have influenced the overall results found in the previous empirical literature.
Accordingly, dummy variables were created to control for them. A complete list of variables is
provided in Table 1. Not all of these potential moderators were used in the regression analysis.
Those that lacked statistical significance were eventually dropped in the analysis. Here we
discuss the main issues addressed.

Dimension
Year of
Survey

Data Years
Sector

Country

Table 1: Moderator Variables Coded from the Literature Review

Variable
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s
2010
YearsData
Education
Water and Sanitation
Garbage Collection
Urban Transportation
Other Services
USA
Spain
UK
Other countries
Jurisdictions

Unit of
Analysis
Estimation
OLS
Methodology SUR
MLE
2SLS
FE
GLS
GMM
BYS
Dataset
Cross Section
Structure
Panel
Pooled

Definition
Obs.
Value 1 if survey year from that decade, 0 otherwise.
18
Value 1 if survey year from that decade, 0 otherwise.
6
Value 1 if survey year from that decade, 0 otherwise.
21
Value 1 if survey year from that decade, 0 otherwise.
18
Value 1 if survey year from that decade, 0 otherwise.
13
Value 1 if more than one year, 0 otherwise.
29
Value 1 if it focuses on Education, 0 otherwise.
15
Value 1 if it focuses on Water and Sanitation, 0 otherwise.
18
Value 1 if it focuses on Garbage collection, 0 otherwise.
20
Value 1 if it focuses on Urban transportation, 0 otherwise.
10
Value 1 if it focuses on a sector not specified before, 0 otherwise.
13
Value 1 if the data is from USA, 0 otherwise
28
Value 1 if the data is from Spain, 0 otherwise
16
Value 1 if the data is from UK, 0 otherwise
4
Value 1 if the data is from a country not listed before, 0 otherwise.
28
Value 1 if a jurisdictional unit is focus of analysis, 0 if a production unit 45
(municipal firm, etc.)
Value 1 if it uses Ordinary Least Squares, 0 otherwise.
35
Value 1 if it uses Seemingly Unrelated Regression, 0 otherwise.
22
Value 1 if it uses Maximum Likelihood Estimation, 0 otherwise.
6
Value 1 if it uses Two-Stages Least Squares, 0 otherwise.
4
Value 1 if it uses Fixed Effects, 0 otherwise.
4
Value 1 if it uses Generalized Least Squares, 0 otherwise.
3
Value 1 if it uses Generalized Method of Moments, 0 otherwise.
1
Value 1 if it uses Spatial Bayesian, 0 otherwise.
1
Value 1 if the structure is a Cross Section, 0 otherwise.
48
Value 1 if the structure is a Panel, 0 otherwise.
22
Value 1 if the structure is a Pooled dataset, 0 otherwise.
4
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Time series
Cost function Log linear
form
Linear
Translog
Quadratic
Expend. Data Expenditure
Output Data Physical Output

Value 1 if the structure is a Time Series, 0 otherwise.
Value 1 if the cost function is Log linear, 0 otherwise.
Value 1 if the cost function is Linear, 0 otherwise.
Value 1 if the cost function is a Translog, 0 otherwise.
Value 1 if the cost function is Quadratic, 0 otherwise.
Value 1 if expenditure data used for dependent variable, 0 if cost data
Value 1 if a measure of physical output is used, 0 if population used as
a proxy for output.
Dummies for Positive Elasticity
Value 1 is the cost elasticity observed is > 0
Elasticity
Negative Elasticity Value 1 if the cost elasticity observed is < 0
Definition of Baumol
Value 1 if Baumol et al (1988) definition of EOS, 0 if Caves et al
EOS
(1984)
Multiple
Multiple Observation Value 1 if it has multiple observations, 0 otherwise
Observations
Population
Population Density Value 1 if Population Density is used as control variable, 0 otherwise.
Density

2
37
6
31
2
27
42
60
16
69
33
31

First, our coding process included the creation of a variable for the country in which the
study took place. Almost half of the 76 observations eventually considered for the metaregression were from U.S.-based studies (28), but the sample also included several European,
Asian, and Latin American countries. The dataset also creates a moderator variable representing
whether the unit of analysis for the study was a production unit (e.g., a bus public company) or a
jurisdiction (including studies with municipal, district, or city focus). A certain overlap is
observed, however, between this variable and the one that denotes whether cost or expenditure
data were used as the dependent variable of the analysis, perhaps increasing the risk of multicollinearity if both variables are included at the same time.
In terms of the characteristics of the dataset used in studies reviewed, we created
dummies denoting cross-section, panel, or time series data sets. As Berechman and Giuliano
(1984) point out, cross sectional data renders biased estimates as it assumes homogeneity of the
observations (i.e. jurisdictions, public companies, etc.). However, the direction of this bias is not
clear and the answer must be left to the empirical analysis. Equally, we coded the estimation
method of the cost function, a variable also closely linked to the dataset structure.
Regarding the modeling framework of the cost function, we created dummy variables for
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studies using linear, log-linear or translog functional forms of the production cost function. As
discussed, the translog modeling framework, which reduces the assumptions imposed on the
behavior of the dependent variable, is expected to provide more solid estimations results; but
here, again, the impact on the estimated coefficient is an empirical issue.
Another dummy variable was created to denote whether expenditure (as opposed to cost)
data were (1) or were not (0) used to create the dependent variable in the analysis; the presence
of this moderator is expected to bias downwards the estimates of economies of scale. In addition,
we created a dummy variable denoting whether the output variable used population as a proxy
(0) or used a physical measure of output (1), such as gallons of water or tons of garbage.
Other moderator variables created during the coding process included a variable denoting
whether the Baumol et al. (1988) or the Caves et al. (1984) definitions of economies of scale
were used in the study. It is to be expected—as already discussed above—that the estimated cost
elasticity of output would be lower when the latter measure is used in the analysis. In addition,
we created dummies for whether the study controlled for service production alternatives (i.e.,
private, public, volunteer services), for cases where the analysis was disaggregated by population
groups, for cases where more than one observation was obtained from the same study, and for
whether the study controlled for population density. Finally, our model included the elasticity’s
standard errors, the degrees of freedom for each study, the number of years for which data were
available in each study, and the total number of observations as size variables and controls for
the robustness of results.
The model specification also included moderators that should allow us to control for
important econometric considerations. We coded papers by the year of their publication and the
year of the survey. These are potentially important moderators that may absorb variations in the
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values of our dependent variable due to changes in productive technology. In some sectors,
technological advances have been offering greater flexibility of production (i.e., possibilities for
diversification with relatively lower levels of production) with lower relative fixed capital
investment requirements, which may have somewhat reduced the potential for economies of
scale if total costs of production are considered. From that point of view, earlier analysis may
show greater potential for economies of scale than later ones.
Another important control variable that was coded is the type of public service that was
the focus of the study. As discussed in our theoretical framework, we would expect to find
greater economies of scale in more capital-intensive services such as urban transportation or
water supply and sanitation, where spreading fixed costs among larger clienteles could lead to
lower average costs.
Finally, our sample of studies used a great diversity of data sets, which minimizes the
presence of data dependency or sample overlap. 7
Funnel plots are a visual tool for dealing with publication and other bias in meta-analysis
(Sterne & Harbord, 2004; p. 127). Publication bias exists when the probability of a study being
published is higher if it reports statistically significant results (Bom & Ligthart, 2009). The term
funnel plot is drawn from the “inverted funnel” shape that the scatter plot of the variable of
interest and the measure of study size take in the absence of publication bias.
In our meta-analysis, each point in the funnel plots presented below depicts a particular
study’s value of the cost elasticity of production in the horizontal axis, and its standard error (or
inverted degrees of freedom when so stated) as the measure of study size in the vertical axis. If

For example, an area where there is potential for dataset dependency is that of comparative fiscal decentralization
studies, commonly using the International Monetary Fund’s Global Financial Statistics.

7
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the sample of 76 observations (from 56 studies) considered in this meta-analysis were not to
display publication bias, we should expect the data points representing the studies of smaller size
(larger standard error) to scatter widely at the bottom of the funnel, whereas those studies with
the smaller standard error (or lower value of the inverse degrees of freedom) would concentrate
at the top around the “true” effect value.
Figure 1. Cost Elasticity Funnel Plot Analysis, Pseudo 95% Confidence Limits
Chart 1. All obs. with reported standard errors. Chart 2. Obs. weighted by inv. deg. of freedom.

Chart 3. Obs. using log-linear functions.

Chart 4. Obs. using translog functions.

As shown in Table 2, the sample unconditional mean is 0.597, which indicates the
existence of (some) economies of scale, with a minimum value of the cost elasticity of output of
-0.947 and a maximum of 1.524. Thus, the observations in the data set range from showing large
economies of scale to sizable decreasing returns to scale.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
All
Education
Garbage Collection
Water and Sanitation

Observations
76
15
20
18

Mean
0.597
0.311
0.933
0.716

Std. Dev.
0.515
0.558
0.198
0.314

Min
-0.947
-0.632
0.272
-0.245

Max
1.524
1.524
1.366
1.086
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Chart 1 in Figure 1 displays the first funnel plot, where all 55 observations for which we
have standard errors reported are plotted. It includes observations for most of the public services
considered and for all types of functional forms of the cost function being reviewed. The plug-in
routine for Stata-generated funnel plots calculates the fixed effects meta-estimate, which
determines the position of the solid vertical line of the chart. The dependent variable is the cost
elasticity of output and the independent variable the standard error of the coefficient. This is a
weighted average where the weights represent the inverse variance of the estimate. The
discontinuous lines that form the inverted “funnel” represent the 95% confidence limits around
the summary treatment effects. It is important to note that the fixed effects estimate obtained
from the funnel plots does not include any of the moderator variables that will be used later on in
the meta-regression.
The funnel plot on Chart 1 presents a twin-peak structure that is relatively uncommon in
meta-analysis. A first group of studies with relatively low standard errors concentrate around a
value of 1 for the cost elasticity of output, signaling from limited returns to scale or slight
diseconomies of scale. A second peak is found around the value 0 of cost elasticity of output,
signaling relatively large economies of scale with similarly small standard errors. This latter
group of studies is considerably smaller in number though. Only 19 observations out of the 55
for which standard errors are available in our sample reported a cost elasticity of output below
0.5. In this group, 8 of those observations corresponded to studies in the education sector, and 12
of them used a log-linear function to model the cost function.
The remaining 36 observations in the sample with standard errors reported included 18
observations on the garbage services sector, 8 in the water supply services and sanitation services
and 4 in urban transport services. The studies’ unit of analysis is mostly jurisdictional units (23),
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24 of them use cross sectional data, 14 assume a translog cost functional form, and 13 of them
took place in the USA.
The inclusion in the funnel plot analysis of those observations that do not report standard
errors does not significantly change the results (see Chart 2). In this chart, the measure of size
used is the inverse of the degrees of freedom, a common alternative to the individual standard
errors. The pattern is somewhat less clear, although the two-peak structure is also identifiable
around values of the cost elasticity coefficient of 1 and 0. Neither funnel plot (Charts 1 and 2)
presents the symmetrical distribution that would signal absence of publication bias. The large
heterogeneity among the studies and services analyzed prevents this. The first two funnel plots,
in addition, do not allow us to establish the direction of the publication bias, and thus additional
quantitative analysis will be undertaken to test for it in the next section.
We can, however, look more closely at the drivers of the “twin peak” distribution
obtained from the general funnel plots. As discussed, it would seem to be partially determined by
the distribution of studies using a log-linear function as the modeling framework for the
estimation of cost elasticities. Chart 3 shows the funnel plot obtained from the representation of
just such studies. The two peaks around the 1 and 0 values of the cost elasticity of output
dependent variable are clearly identifiable.
This compares with a completely different distribution of studies which use the translog
function as the modeling framework for the estimation of production costs. In Chart 4 we can
observe that those studies report, in general, very low standard errors and although the funnel
shape that would indicate absence of publication bias is also absent, values of the cost elasticity
coefficient bunch in the interval 0.5 to 1.
In terms of the sectoral distribution of observations, results from studies on education
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services are leading the overall distribution of observations towards the two-peaked structure
observed. Figure 2 below depicts the funnel plots for the four sectors that contain the largest
numbers of observations, namely education, garbage collection, water supply and sanitation, and
urban transportation services. These four sectors account for 59 out of the 76 observations in the
sample. As we mentioned, a total of six observations from studies on education reported cost
elasticity coefficients lower than 0.5 (Chart 5), while only two observations for water supply and
one for garbage collection report those low elasticities.
Figure 2. Cost Elasticity Funnel Plot Analysis, Pseudo 95% Confidence Limits, Sectoral
Distribution

Chart 5. Obs., Education

Chart 6. Obs., Garbage Collection

Chart 7. Obs., Water Supply and Sanitation

Chart 8. Obs., Urban Transportation

Chart 6 in Figure 2, depicting the funnel plot for observations on the garbage collection
sector, offers the single-peaked, well-behaved funnel plot distribution that presumes absence of
publication bias. Most of the observations are within the 95% confidence interval defined by the
funnel, and the “true” value of the cost elasticity of output in this sector seems to be defined at
around 0.9. The plots for the water supply and urban transportation sector show also a relatively
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standard distribution (meaning single peaked, with most of the observations contained within the
95% confidence interval of the inverted funnel) of observations.
Thus, we can conclude that the double peaked plot obtained in Chart 1 is driven by the
observations from studies in the education sector which yield values of the cost elasticity of
output that are close to 0, signaling sizable economies of scale. For those observations, a loglinear form for the estimation of the cost function was primarily used. We anticipate this may
have important implications for our meta-regression analysis, to which we turn next.
5. Meta-regression Analysis
5.1 Testing for publication bias
We test first for publication bias under the assumption of homogeneity among studies in
specification (1). Thus, we do not include any of the moderator variables identified during the
coding process in our meta-regression. If the only differences between studies are due to
sampling error (“within-study” heterogeneity), then the fixed effects estimation would be the
adequate estimation methodology. If, however, large “between-study” heterogeneity is expected,
then we should consider the use of random effects estimation to account for both sources of
heterogeneity. Main results are reported in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3: Publication Bias Analysis, Fixed Effects

No PB
Linear PB.
Unidirectional
Linear PB.
Bidirectional
Non-linear PB.
Unidirectional
Non-linear PB.
Bidirectional

Output Cost Elast.
0.295** (0.141)
0.270* (0.146)
0.263* (0.143)
0.293** (0.143)
0.294** (0.144)

α

31.843*
(18.11)
34.203
(44.030)

αp

64.068**
(24.400)

αn

R2 N
Q-test
I2
0.293 55 14699.26*** 99.60%
0.316 55

-599.918 0.369 55
0.294 55

244.196 -130.756**
(164.459) (30.362) 0.295 55

Notes: Where I2 is variation due to “between-study” heterogeneity and the Q-test is of
Heterogeneity with degrees of freedom of 54. Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * =
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
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Table 3 shows the fixed effects estimates. Our estimate of cost elasticity of output under
this assumption is somewhat smaller than the simple average for all estimates. The literature may
have favored the publication of studies that reported negative cost elasticity of output, signaling
large economies of scale in public good provision. As we have seen, most of these studies belong
to the area of education. The fixed effects estimates are however compromised by the large
amount of between-study heterogeneity as indicated by the Q-test. 8 In addition, the I2 test shows
that 99.6% of the heterogeneity found in the sample is due to “between-study” differences.
Table 4. Publication Bias Analysis, Random Effects

No PB
Linear PB.
Unidirectional
Linear PB.
Bidirectional
Non-linear PB.
Unidirectional
Non-linear PB.
Bidirectional

Output Cost Elast.
0.581*** (0.064)

α

0.681*** (0.105) -1.391 (1.149)
0.591*** (0.075)
0.640*** (0.071)
0.600*** (0.064)

-28.238691

αp

αn

1.946** -6.724***
(0.948)
(1.131)
8.542 -49.473***
(20.218) (15.855)

N I2 Residual
55
99.49%
55

99.56%

55

99.25%

55

99.63%

55

99.64%

Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * = statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Due to the large heterogeneity among studies (in sectors, modeling frameworks, etc.),

random effects estimation is recommended. These results are shown in Table 4. These estimates
confirm the nature and the direction of the publication bias, with studies reporting negative
values of cost elasticity of output driving the “true” average value in our sample.
However, the estimations presented in Tables 3 and 4 explain a small amount of the
between study variation, an average of 30 percent. We therefore turn to analyzing the case where
observed heterogeneity between studies with the insertion of moderator variables in the metaregression is allowed. In line with Harbord and Higgings (2008; p. 497) and our earlier results,

The Q-test is a common measure of heterogeneity used in the literature. It is the sum of the squared deviations of
each study’s effect estimate from the overall effect estimate (Huedo-Medina et al., 2006).
8
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we do not estimate the fixed effects meta-regression, as such estimation assumes that “all
heterogeneity can be explained by the covariates,” leading to excessive type I errors in cases (as
ours) of unobserved heterogeneity. In the random effects model, the weights used in the weighted
least squares estimation include not only the standard errors of each individual observation, but
the between study variance.
Table 5 presents the random effects estimation of the model with observed heterogeneity.
The first column reports results without testing for publication bias, while the second and third
columns of Table 5 include the publication bias test in its linear and non-linear form,
respectively. This first set of results offer interesting insights as to the determinants of the
estimations found in the empirical literature of the cost elasticity of output. The first relevant
result is the value of the conditional mean of the cost elasticity of output. In principle, due to the
larger amount of “between-study heterogeneity” explained under the linear publication bias test,
it would seem that such estimation presents the better fit for the model. The estimated coefficient
for the constant term, the conditional mean of the sample, is 0.529. This signals the presence of
some economies of scale for works published in the 2010s, in sectors other than education and
garbage collection that used predominantly the Cobb-Douglas form approach to the cost
production function, and also used cost as opposed to expenditure data and population as a proxy
for output. The non-linear publication bias test yields a conditional mean of the cost elasticity of
output of 0.297, signaling economies of scale. The results, using studies published in the last
decade as the reference group, also show large variations in the value of the conditional mean
depending on the inclusion of the publication bias test. Once we control for bidirectional
publication bias, the estimates of the cost elasticity of output increase substantially, lowering the
extent of economies of scale.
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Our time dummies show that, having the 2010s as reference group, estimates of
economies of scale seem to have been larger in the 1980s; this is a period in which the
sophistication of the analyses increases considerably with the generalization of log linear
function estimation specifications and the first contributions using translog cost functions.
However, this effect falls considerably later, with the estimates of the cost elasticity of output
being similar in size between the 1990s and the 2010s. Despite the consistency in the sign of this
relationship, the results are not statistically significant. We thus find no strong support for the
hypothesis that modern production methods, incorporating “leaner” technologies and lower
requirements in terms of capital investment, offer lower potential for economies of scale.
Table 5. Meta-Regression Results, Random Effects Estimation
Constant
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s
Education
Garbage Collection
Translog Cost Function
Expenditure Data
Physical Output
Baumol
Multiple Observations
Population Density
αp
αn
Observations
Residual Variation due to
Heterogeneity
Proportion of Between-Study
Variance Explained
τ2 (Between-study Variance)
Prob > F

76
96.23%

PB Linear
Bidirectional Test
0.529** (0.228)
0.573*** (0.137)
0.205
(0.188)
0.335** (0.150)
0.370*** (0.131)
-0.508*** (0.155)
0.528*** (0.146)
0.318** (0.127)
0.202* (0.113)
-0.289** (0.117)
-0.195
(0.151)
0.152
(0.111)
-0.280*** (0.082)
-0.681
(0.835)
-4.465*** (0.991)
55
97.00%

PB Non-Linear
Bidirectional Test
0.297
(0.244)
0.637*** (0.153)
0.120
(0.215)
0.293* (0.170)
0.373** (0.147)
-0.504*** (0.176)
0.708*** (0.152)
0.507*** (0.128)
0.272** (0.129)
-0.279
(0.131)
-0.185
(0.170)
0.146
(0.126)
-0.303*** (0.093)
-7.821 (14.961)
-31.968** (12.276)
55
97.56%

70.02%

79.01%

72.09%

0.065
0.0000

0.045
0.0000

0.060
0.0000

No PB Test
0.224
(0.248)
0.662*** (0.158)
0.149
(0.220)
0.329* (0.175)
0.375** (0.151)
-0.453** (0.180)
0.732*** (0.156)
0.539*** (0.132)
0.235* (0.132)
-0.276* (0.135)
-0.170
(0.130)
0.172
(0.130)
-0.309*** (0.096)

Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * = statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Our initial hypotheses regarding the sectoral distribution of economies of scale and

capital input intensity are now confronted with opposing empirical evidence. Among the critical
sectors analyzed, education consistently displayed a negative and highly significant coefficient in
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different model specifications. Economies of scale seem to be potentially greater in the education
sector despite the presumption that this service displays a more labor-intensive production
method and even after other moderator variables are included in the analysis. Studies analyzing
economies of scale in the garbage collection sector, an assumed capital-intensive sector,
displayed higher cost elasticities of output, meaning lower economies of scale—although the
results were not statistically significant. The results for the water and sanitation sector were not
found statistically significant either in the alternative model specifications.
From the results in Table 5, we can also see that greater sophistication in the modeling of
production costs leads to smaller estimates of economies of scale. The use of the translog
function has, all other things equal, led to higher estimates of cost elasticity of output in the
literature. Acknowledging that the translog functions offers substantial advantages in the study of
economies of scale, we can conclude that the use of log linear (Cobb-Douglas based) functional
forms for the estimation of economies of scale may have led to the overestimation of economies
of scale across the board. Lastly, the empirical results show the relevance of controlling for
population density in the evaluation of economies of scale, as Tran et al. (2018) have observed.
Studies using population density as a moderator generally report lower estimates of cost
elasticity of output, increasing the extent of economies of scale.
The bias introduced in the analysis of economies of scale using inadequate measures of
output is also made obvious from the results in Table 5. The use of expenditure data, as opposed
to cost data, substantially increases the estimates of cost elasticity of output, thus reducing the
perceived potential of economies of scale. Also, as previously discussed, the use of expenditure
data as a proxy for production costs introduces distortions in the analysis, as expenditure data
includes administrative items not necessarily related to the production of services. In addition,
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the use of physical output instead of population as a proxy for production proves to be critically
important for the results obtained. As expected, more accurate (physical) measures of output led
to larger estimates of economies of scale in the literature.
Lastly, the meta-regression results in Table 5 show no impact from the use of different
definitions of economies of scale (i.e., Baumol or Caves). We interpret this as a positive sign for
the consistency of our sample; more specifically, the negative result offers some relief regarding
the possible distortion introduced by the heterogeneity in the measurement of our dependent
variable. The results in Table 5 also show that studies with multiple observations may tend to
report greater estimates of cost elasticity of output, that is, smaller economies of scale, although
the significance of the coefficients was not robust to different model specifications.
Several other control variables were included in earlier model specifications but were
found not significant. Country dummies were consistently found to be not significant. Their
introduction as moderators in some cases was even pernicious as they could display high
correlation with other moderators (for instance, 10 of the 16 observations from Spain come from
studies in the garbage collection sector, creating multicollinearity between the country and the
sectoral dummy). Individual significance tests also recommended their elimination from the
sample with no loss of explanatory value. The variables identifying the structure of the dataset
used in the study (e.g., cross-sections, panel, etc.), and the estimation method (e.g., OLS, SUR,
etc.) proved to be equally non-significant. As expected, high correlation was found between the
variables measuring the dataset structure, the estimation methodologies, and the form of the cost
function, so most had to be discarded from the final specification. We also note that the results in
Table 5 were robust to the inclusion or not of these other control variables.
As we conjectured above, our general results are greatly driven by the studies in
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education. We saw in Table 1 that the mean cost elasticity of output in the sector of education is
the lowest among the three main sectoral groups of observations. Also, in Chart 5 in Figure 2, we
observed that most of the observations reporting negative or low output cost elasticity are
obtained from studies in the education sector. Thus, in order to test the robustness of our results
to sectoral composition, we estimate additional model specifications which alternatively exclude
each of the three sectors for which the largest number of observations is obtained (i.e., education,
garbage collection, and water and sanitation). The results are shown in Table 6. For brevity, only
selected variables are reported.
Table 6. Sectoral Disaggregation. Random Effects Estimation
Constant
(1) Garbage Collection
(2) Education
(3) Water and Sanit.
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s
Translog Cost Function
Expenditure Data
Physical Output
Baumol
Multiple Observations
Population Density
Number of Observations
Residual Variation due to
Heterogeneity
Proportion of Between Study
Variance Explained
τ2 (Between-study Variance)

(1) Without Education (2) Without Water and Sanitation (3) Without Garbage
0.267
(0.256)
-0.380
(0.394)
-0.312
(0.349)
0.793*** (0.158)
0.489** (0.201)
0.349
(0.201)
0.272
(0.197)
0.363** (0.172)
0.507*** (0.138)
0.092
(0.141)
-0.199
(0.149)
-0.128
(0.172)
-0.0004 (0.144)
-0.306*** (0.108)
61

-0.859*** (0.190)
0.989*** (0.179)
0.709*** (0.209)
0.827*** (0.190)
0.857*** (0.180)
0.431** (0.180)
0.163
(0.162)
-0.430*** (0.152)
0.033
(0.286)
0.567*** (0.156)
-0.218* (0.115)
58

0.075
(0.173)
0.549*** (0.180)
-0.212
(0.309)
0.154
(0.224)
-0.083
(0.267)
0.748*** (0.161)
0.324
(0.196)
0.216
(0.172)
-0.041
(0.206)
0.177
(0.184)
-0.199
(0.180)
56

94.16%

94.80%

95.73%

67.72%
0.059

62.84%
0.089

61.85%
0.083

Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * = statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.

The significance and robustness of the results obtained in Table 5 do not seem to be
affected by any particular sector. The alternate exclusion of education, water and sanitation, and
garbage collection from the estimations changes the constant and sectoral coefficients
substantially but the results for the other determinants remain significant. The use of the translog
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function continues to determine results and leads to lower estimates of economies of scale, as is
the case with the use of expenditure over cost data. As expected, the variation is wider for the
estimates of physical output, as this variable is substantially more correlated with the sectoral
studies (e.g., education studies use population as their measure of output). 9
6. Conclusions
Our review of the empirical literature shows that the evidence on the existence of
economies of scale in the delivery of local public services is not very strong, with multiple
studies reporting constant or decreasing returns to scale in a variety of services. In this paper, we
use meta-analysis to systematize the wide range of empirical approaches and modeling
frameworks found in the literature and help identify the determinants behind the results found.
At best, the inclusion of studies from several sectors in our analysis seems to confirm the
presence of moderately increasing to constant returns to scale in the provision of local services.
The potential for economies of scale seems to differ greatly, at least across three traditional
services: education, water and sanitation, and garbage collection, being highest for education and
lowest for garbage collection. Our analysis also offers guidelines for future empirical research in
this area. Physical output and production cost data should be used, together with translog
specifications for the modeling of cost functions.
The estimates of economies of scale selected for our meta-regression are those at the
mean of the sample distribution of each study. As such, our analysis does not offer insights
regarding the extent and length of those economies of scale. However, it is unlikely, in the
context of U-shaped long average cost functions, that such economies of scale will be pervasive

Our analysis also included the estimation of sector-specific meta-regressions for those sectors with sufficient
observations (garbage and water supply and sanitation). However, as expected little variation was found among the
most critical moderators within a particular sector and for space reasons those results are not shown here.

9
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well beyond the average production point.
This general conclusion may be somewhat surprising to policymakers in the many
countries where there has been a significant push for reforming the vertical structure of
government by using forced jurisdictional consolidation programs. The evidence is so far
generally weak that larger “client” bases allow reducing the average costs of production in the
delivery of most local public services beyond certain a modest jurisdiction size, which many
studies in this literature have estimated at 10,000 residents. Any program of jurisdictional
consolidation needs to be anchored on an analysis of the potential economies of scale on the
services that have been decentralized to those units.
For conducting such an analysis, this paper offers significant methodological insights:
using production cost data and a translog specification function. In short, the expected savings
from enlarging population size at the local government level may not be present at all and should
not be automatically assumed. Conducting the proper analysis, we might find cases where
jurisdictional consolidation is profitable or even appropriate for other causes, such as reducing
administrative overhead or developing adequate administrative capacity and skills; however,
experience suggests that forced jurisdictional consolidation may often fail to bring cost or scale
advantages. When considering jurisdictional consolidation, it would be also desirable to keep in
mind that the desirable economies of scale may also be obtained via alternate processes such as
privatization or inter-jurisdictional cooperation. In any case, transaction costs due to the need for
monitoring the quality of service provision or negotiation with partners and providers may be
also relevant for all those alternatives (Baba & Asami, 2020).
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